Approximations and asymptotics of upper hedging prices in multinomial
  models by Nakajima, Ryuichi et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
00
7.
43
72
v2
  [
q-
fin
.PR
]  
30
 Ju
n 2
01
1
Approximations and asymptotics of upper hedging
prices in multinomial models
Ryuichi Nakajima∗, Masayuki Kumon†, Akimichi Takemura∗
and Kei Takeuchi‡
Revised, June 2010
Abstract
We give an exposition and numerical studies of upper hedging prices in multi-
nomial models from the viewpoint of linear programming and the game-theoretic
probability of Shafer and Vovk. We also show that, as the number of rounds goes
to infinity, the upper hedging price of a European option converges to the solution
of the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation.
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1 Introduction
The Black-Scholes formula for the geometric Brownian motion model and the Cox-Ross-
Rubinstein formula for the binomial model are now treated in many standard textbooks
on mathematical finance (e.g. [13, 21, 22]). Since these models are complete, the exact
price for any contingent claim is determined by arbitrage argument. On the other hand,
incomplete models such as the trinomial model are only briefly mentioned in the textbooks
because of difficulty associated with indeterminacy of prices of contingent claims.
In fact only a few explicit results seem to be known on upper hedging prices for the
discrete-time multinomial models. The purpose of this paper is to give an exposition
of the exact and the asymptotic behavior of upper hedging prices of contingent claims
in multinomial models. We also show that the asymptotic upper hedging price of a
European option is described by the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation (e.g. [1], [26], [9],
[12], Chapter 4 of [15]). The Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation is usually considered for
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uncertain volatility models in continuous time and its relation to multinomial models does
not seem to be stated in literature.
The advantage of discrete-time multinomial models is that we can exactly compute the
upper hedging price by backward induction for moderate number of rounds and various
approximations to the upper hedging price can be compared to the exact value. Basic
facts on the upper hedging price for discrete models are well explained in Chapter 4 of the
first edition of Musiela and Rutkowski [13]. General treatments of incomplete markets
are given in Chapter 5 of [10] and [18]. However they are concerned with continuous
stochastic processes and do not contain much numerical information on the behavior of
upper hedging prices for discrete models.
An extensive numerical study of hedging in incomplete markets is given in [3]. Its
authors consider a hedging strategy which minimizes the mean-squared error to the payoff
of a contingent claim under Markov-state dynamics. As we see in Section 2 below, for
studying the behavior of upper hedging prices we can not make convenient stochastic
assumptions such as the Markov property. Results more relevant to the present paper
have been given in [17] and [5] by convex ordering argument. In particular for discrete
time models with bounded martingale differences, [17] proves that the upper hedging price
of a convex contingent claim is given by the extremal binomial model. We reproduce this
fact in Proposition 2.4 below by linear programming argument.
In this paper we use the framework of game-theoretic probability by Shafer and Vovk.
We prefer the framework because of the following reasons. First, in game-theoretic proba-
bility only the protocol of a game between “Investor” and “Market” is formulated without
specification of a probability measure. Therefore there is no need to distinguish a risk
neutral measure from an actual (or a physical) measure and to consider the equivalence
between them. This is advantageous because the extremal risk neutral measure corre-
sponding to the upper hedging price usually has a support smaller than those in the
interior of the set of risk neutral measures. Second, some strong properties of a price path
of Market can be proved in game-theoretic probability without any stochastic assumption
(e.g. see [25], [27], [28] and references therein). As a referee pointed out [4] studies non-
probabilistic approach for pricing in continuous time. Third, the notion of upper hedging
price is of central importance to game-theoretic probability as shown in our recent works
([24], [20]) on game-theoretic probability.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give a linear programming
formulation of upper hedging prices in multinomial models and state some basic facts in
several propositions. In Section 3 we give some simple bounds for upper hedging prices.
Then in Section 4 we show that, as the number of rounds goes to infinity, the upper
hedging price of a European option converges to the solution of an additive form of the
Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation. In Section 5 we present numerical studies on the
accuracy of the partial differential equation and other approximations. Some concluding
remarks are given in Section 6.
2
2 Formulation of upper hedging price
In this section we formulate the upper hedging price for a multinomial game from the
viewpoint of linear programming and the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk
[19]. Also we show some known facts on upper hedging prices.
Let X ⊂ R be a finite set containing both negative and positive elements. The protocol
of the multinomial game ofN rounds with the initial capital ofK0 = α is written as follows.
K0 = α
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Investor announces Mn ∈ R.
Market announces xn ∈ X .
Kn := Kn−1 +Mnxn.
END FOR
We call XN the sample space and ξ = x1 . . . xN ∈ XN a path of Market’s moves. For
1 ≤ n ≤ N , ξn = x1 . . . xn ∈ X n is a partial path. Investor’s strategy P is a function
specifying Mn based on ξ
n−1 = x1 . . . xn−1:
P : x1 . . . xn−1 7→ Mn.
with some initial value M1 = P(), where  denotes the initial empty path. When
Investor adopts P, his capital at the end of round n is written as α +KPn , where
KPn =
n∑
i=1
P(ξi−1)xi.
We can write the progression of the game in a rooted tree with the root . For n < N ,
ξn is an intermediate node branching to ξnxn+1, xn+1 ∈ X . The final nodes are ξ ∈ XN .
We call a function f : XN → R a payoff function or a contingent claim. The upper
hedging price (or simply the upper price) of f is defined as
E¯(f) = inf{α | ∃P s.t. α +KPN(ξ) ≥ f(ξ), ∀ξ ∈ XN}
and the lower hedging price is defined as
E(f) = −E¯(−f). (1)
The upper hedging price and the lower hedging price are often called seller’s price and
buyer’s price, respectively. A strategy P with the initial capital α satisfying α+KPN(ξ) ≥
f(ξ), ∀ξ ∈ XN , is called a superreplicating strategy for f .
The problem of obtaining the upper hedging price can be formulated in linear pro-
gramming. Let X = {a1, . . . , ak}. For the single step case N = 1, E¯(f) is obtained as the
following minimum:
α =
(
1 0
)( α
M1
)
→ min s.t.


1 a1
1 a2
...
...
1 ak


(
α
M1
)
≥


f(a1)
f(a2)
...
f(ak)

 . (2)
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For the two-step case N = 2, Investor can choose his investment at round 2 depending
on the Market’s move in the first round. Therefore E¯(f) is written as the following
minimum:
α =
(
1 0 0 0 . . . 0
)


α
M1
M2|a1
M2|a2
...
M2|ak


→ min
s.t.


1 a1 a1 0 0 . . . 0
1 a1 a2 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
... . . .
...
1 a1 ak 0 0 . . . 0
1 a2 0 a1 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
... . . .
...
1 a2 0 ak 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
... . . .
...
1 ak 0 0 0 . . . ak




α
M1
M2|a1
M2|a2
...
M2|ak

 ≥


f(a1a1)
f(a1a2)
...
f(a1ak)
f(a2a1)
...
f(a2ak)
...
f(akak)


.
For general N , the coefficient matrix AN : k
N × (1 + (kN − 1)/(k − 1)) is recursively
defined as
AN =

1kN AˆN−1 ⊗ 1k Ik ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ik︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−1
⊗


a1
a2
...
ak



 ,
where 1k is a k-dimensional vector of 1’s, AˆN is AN without the first column and ⊗
denotes the Kronecker product. Then
E¯(f) = min(1 0 . . . 0) m, s.t. ANm ≥ f , (3)
where f is a kN -dimensional vector consisting of f(ξ), ξ ∈ XN , and
m⊤ = (α M1 M2|a1 . . . M2|ak . . . Mn|ξn−1 . . . MN |ak ...ak).
Since the size of AN grows exponentially with N , it becomes difficult to directly
solve the linear programming problem for a general path-dependent contingent claim f .
Exploiting the recursive structure of the coefficient matrix AN , the linear programming
problem can be solved by backward induction, i.e. by solving the single-step optimizations
for N,N − 1, . . . , 1. This will be explicitly described in (8) below. Therefore the single-
step optimization in (2) is essential. However even with backward induction, for a general
path-dependent f , the number of single-step optimizations grows exponentially with N .
This is because the number of nodes of the game tree grows exponentially with N and
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the single-step optimization for the backward induction is performed at each node of the
game tree. This difficulty is somewhat mitigated in the case of a European option f ,
where f is a function of SN = x1 + · · ·+ xN only. Then the game tree can be collapsed
according to the values of Sn = x1 + · · · + xn and the number of nodes of the collapsed
tree grows only polynomially with N . In fact, for generic values of a1, . . . , ak, the number
of values taken by SN is
(
N+k−1
k−1
)
.
Now we consider the single-step optimization in (2). Let X contain l negative elements
and m = k − l positive elements, which are ordered as
0 > a−1 > a
−
2 > · · · > a−l , 0 ≤ a+1 < a+2 < · · · < a+m.
Note that we allow the case a1+ = 0, which needs some special consideration. For the
single-step game the following result is given in Proposition 4.1.1 of [13]. We give our own
proof based on consideration of dual linear programming problem to (2).
Proposition 2.1. The upper hedging price of f in the single-step game N = 1 is given
by
E¯(f) = max
i,j
(
a+j f(a
−
i )− a−i f(a+j )
a+j − a−i
)
. (4)
Proof. Let p = (p−1 . . . p
−
l p
+
1 . . . p
+
m)
⊤ and consider the following dual problem to (2):
(f(a−1 ) . . . f(a
−
l ) f(a
+
1 ) . . . f(a
+
m)) p→ max
s.t.
(
1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1
a−1 · · · a−l a+1 · · · a+m
)
p =
(
1
0
)
, p ≥ 0. (5)
Note that the coefficient matrix is 2 × k. Therefore the maximum is attained by a basic
solution involving two variables.
First consider the case a+1 > 0. If we choose two variables either from {p−1 , p−2 , . . . , p−l }
or from {p+1 , p+2 , . . . , p+m}, then the solution does not satisfy p ≥ 0 and it is infeasi-
ble. Therefore for a feasible basic solution we need to choose one variable p−i from
{p−1 , p−2 , . . . , p−l } and another variable p+j from {p+1 , p+2 , . . . , p+m}. Then the basic solution
is given by
p−i = p
−
i;j =
a+j
a+j − a−i
, p+j = p
+
j;i =
−a+i
a+j − a+i
(6)
and the value of the objective function is given by (a+j f(a
−
i )− a−i f(a+j ))/(a+j − a−i ).
Now consider the case a+1 = 0. Then for j = 1 we have (a
+
j f(a
−
i ) − a−i f(a+j ))/(a+j −
a−i ) = f(0), which is consistent with (5) and (6). Therefore this case does not require a
separate statement. This proves the proposition.
By (1) the lower hedging price E(f) for the single-step game is given as
E(f) = min
i,j
(
a+j f(a
−
i )− a−i f(a+j )
a+j − a−i
)
.
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The vector p satisfying (5) is a probability vector over X such that its expectation is
zero:
l∑
i=1
a−i p
−
i +
m∑
j=1
a+j p
+
j = 0.
Let P1 denote the set of probability vectors satisfying (5). p ∈ P1 is called a risk neutral
measure on X . From (5) we have E¯(f) = maxp∈P1 Ep[f ], where Ep[·] denotes the usual
expectation under p. This duality is well known in great generality (see Chapter 5 of
[10]). However the explicit expression of the upper hedging price in (4) is useful for the
purpose of numerical backward induction for N ≥ 2.
Remark 2.2. We can also consider the dual problem to (3) for the N-step problem. It is
easy to see that the set PN of risk neutral measures p = {p(ξ), ξ ∈ X n} is characterized
as follows:
p ∈ PN ⇔ p(x1 . . . xN) = p1(x1)× p2(x2|x1)× · · · × pN(xN |ξN−1), (7)
s.t. pj(· | ξj−1) ∈ P1, j = 1, . . . , n, ∀ξj−1 ∈ X j−1.
Also by duality we have E¯(f) = maxp∈PN E
p[f ]. Note that (7) holds even if p(ξ) = 0 for
some ξ and some conditional probabilities on the right-hand side are not defined. At each
node of the game tree, the conditional distribution of the extremal risk neutral measure
corresponding to E¯(f) is given by a basic solution of the form (4).
Based on (4), the backward induction for obtaining E¯(f) for the N -step game is
described as follows. Define f¯(·, N − n) : X n → R, n = N,N − 1, . . . , 0, by
f¯(ξn, N − n) = max
i,j
(
a+j f¯(ξ
na−i , N − n− 1)− a−i f¯(ξna+j , N − n− 1)
a+j − a−i
)
(8)
with the initial condition f¯(ξN , 0) = f(ξN), ξN ∈ XN . Summarizing the arguments above
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. The upper hedging price of f in the N-step game is given by
E¯(f) = f¯(, N).
Consider the case that the payoff f is defined on the whole RN . Then we have the
following result.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that f is convex. Then E¯(f) is given by the binomial model
concentrated on two outermost values {a−l , a+m}. For the case a+1 > 0 E(f) is given by
the binomial model concentrated on two innermost values {a−1 , a+1 }. For the case a+1 = 0
E(f) = f(0).
This result was proved by Ru¨schendorf ([17]) by a convex ordering argument in a more
general setting, where X is a bounded interval. See also [5]. Corresponding results for
concave f are obtained by using (1). We now give a simple proof of this proposition using
(8).
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Proof. First consider the one-step game N = 1. By convexity of f it is easy to check that
for any a−i and a
+
j the following inequalities hold:
a+mf(a
−
l )− a−l f(a+m)
a+m − a−l
≥ a
+
j f(a
−
i )− a−i f(a+j )
a+j − a−i
≥
{
a+
1
f(a−
1
)−a−
1
f(a+
1
)
a+
1
−a−
1
if a+1 > 0,
f(0) if a+1 = 0.
Hence the proposition holds for the single-step game.
ForN > 1 we can use the induction. We note that f¯(ξn, N−n) is a convex combination
of f(ξnxn+1 . . . xN), xn+1 . . . xN ∈ XN−n, where the weights of the combination are given
by the binomial model and they do not depend on ξn. In particular f¯(ξn, N−n) is convex
in xn.
Remark 2.5. As pointed out in Remark 2 of [17], the above result holds if f is component-
wise convex in every xi, i = 1, . . . , N .
3 Some bounds for upper hedging prices
In this section we present some simple inequalities for upper hedging prices.
We first investigate the relation between binomial model and general multinomial
model. Pick a negative element a−i and a positive element a
+
j from X and restrict the
move space X of Market to the two element set Xi,j = {a−i , a+j }. Then the multinomial
game is reduced to a binomial model, where the price of any contingent claim is given by
an arbitrage argument. Let Ei,j(f) denote the price of f under the binomial model Xi,j.
For the two-element set Xi,j there is no need to take the maximum in (8). On the other
hand, for a multinomial model X we take the maximum in (8) at each node of the game.
This gives the following lower bound for E¯(f):
max
i,j
Ei,j(f) ≤ E¯(f). (9)
Similarly for the lower hedging price we have
min
i,j
Ei,j(f) ≥ E(f).
The above inequalities can be generalized by considering nested move spaces of Market.
Explicitly writing X in the multinomial game, let E¯(f | X ) and E(f | X ) denote the upper
hedging price and the lower hedging price of multinomial game with X as Market’s move
space. Consider two nested move spaces X ⊂ X ′ of Market. Then the same consideration
as above gives the following inequalities:
E(f | X ′) ≤ E(f | X ) ≤ E¯(f | X ) ≤ E¯(f | X ′). (10)
In Section 5 we compare upper and lower hedging prices in trinomial and quadnomial
models.
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We can also consider dynamic restrictions of the move space of Market. For example,
we can consider the maximization in (8) only for even n = 2h and use the maximizer i∗, j∗
from this round for the subsequent round n = 2h + 1. Or we can maximize e.g. every
10th step. By this dynamic restriction we again have a lower bound for the upper hedging
price. As we discuss in the next section, this pruning of maximizations is conceptually
close to discretization of partial differential equation in (13).
We now present another bound when f is a European option depending only on SN .
Let f be defined on the whole R. Assume that f has the first derivative f ′ which is of
bounded variation. Then f ′ is written as a difference of two non-decreasing functions
(Section 5.2 of [16]). By taking the indefinite integral of f ′ we see that f is written as a
sum of a convex function and a concave function:
f = f1 + f2, f1 : convex, f2 : concave.
By the subadditivity of the upper hedging price (Section 8.3 of [19]), we have
E¯(f) ≤ E¯(f1) + E¯(f2). (11)
The bounds in (9) and (11) are very simple. Unfortunately as seen from numerical
examples in Section 5 these bounds are generally not very tight.
4 Limiting behavior of upper hedging price of an Eu-
ropean option
In this section we derive the limit of the upper hedging price of a European option as
N → ∞ in an appropriate sequence of games. Let C2b denote the space of functions
R → R with compact support and continuous second derivatives. Let f ∈ C2b . We
consider a sequence of multinomial games with N rounds, where the payoff fN for the
N -th game is given as
fN(ξ
N) = f(SN/
√
N), SN = x1 + · · ·+ xN . (12)
Note that the expected value under the two-point distribution in (6) is zero and the
variance is given as
(a−i )
2p−i;j + (a
+
j )
2pj;i =
a+j (a
−
i )
2 − a−i (a+j )2
a+j − a−i
= −a−i a+j .
In view of this define the maximum variance and the minimum variance of P1 as
σ¯2 = −a−l a+m > σ2 = −a−1 a+1 .
We now state the following theorem.
8
Theorem 4.1. Let f ∈ C2b and let fN be defined by (12). Assume σ2 > 0. Then
lim
N→∞
E¯(fN) = φ¯(0, 1),
where φ¯(s, t), s ∈ R, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, satisfies the following partial differential equation
∂
∂t
φ¯(s, t) =
σ˜2
2
∂2
∂s2
φ¯(s, t),
{
σ˜2 = σ¯2, if ∂
2
∂s2
φ¯(s, t) ≥ 0,
σ˜2 = σ2, if ∂
2
∂s2
φ¯(s, t) < 0,
(13)
with the boundary condition φ¯(s, 0) = f(s), s ∈ R.
Similarly the following partial differential equation describes the limiting lower price
of fN .
∂
∂t
φ(s, t) =
σ˜2
2
∂2
∂s2
φ(s, t),
{
σ˜2 = σ2, if ∂
2
∂s2
φ(s, t) ≥ 0,
σ˜2 = σ¯2, if ∂
2
∂s2
φ(s, t) < 0.
(14)
We can understand (13) as a piecewise heat equation, where the diffusion coefficient
depends on the convexity or concavity of φ¯. As pointed out by a referee the equation (13)
is studied in [14].
We stated Theorem 4.1 for the simple setting of σ2 > 0 and f ∈ C2b . Theorem 4.6.9
of [15] states that the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation holds for a payoff function with
linear growth condition: for some a, b > 0, |f(s)| ≤ a + b|s|, ∀s ∈ R. In view of this
result we expect our Theorem 4.1 also holds for continuous f satisfying a linear growth
condition. However justifying the limiting argument from discrete time to continuous
time does not seem to be simple.
Remark 4.2. The case σ2 = 0 needs a special consideration, although Theorem 4.1 still
holds for this case. In view of Theorem 4.6.9 of [15], the notion of viscosity solution (cf.
[7]) is needed for (13).
In Section 6.3 of [19] this case was treated using parabolic potential theory. The equiv-
alence of (13) to the treatment in Section 6.3 of [19] is seen by the following intuitive
argument. If σ2 = 0, then (∂/∂t)φ¯(s, t) ≥ 0, ∀s, t, and φ¯ is non-decreasing in t. φ¯ strictly
increases in t at some (s0, t0) if and only if φ¯(s, t) is strictly convex in s at this point.
Then for all t ≥ t0, φ¯(s, t) is (at least weakly) convex in s. This implies that σ˜2 = σ¯2 if
and only if φ¯(s, t) > f(s), which corresponds to the “continuous region” in Section 6.3 of
[19].
The numerical behavior of (13) for this case is well illustrated in Figure 6.2 of [19]. It
should also be noted that φ¯(s,∞) = limt→∞ φ¯(s, t) is the least concave majorant (concave
envelope) of f .
Note that (13) is an additive form of the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation in which
the right-hand side of (13) multiplied by s2:
∂
∂t
φ¯ =
σ˜2
2
s2
∂2
∂s2
φ¯,
{
σ˜2 = σ¯2, if ∂
2
∂s2
φ¯ ≥ 0,
σ˜2 = σ2, if ∂
2
∂s2
φ¯ < 0.
(15)
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Consider a multiplicative model, where Reality chooses positive xn’s and SN = x1×· · ·×
xN is the product of xn’s. A European option is of the form f(SN). In (20) below we
see that the resulting partial differential equation is exactly the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt
equation. Note that the multiplicative model is standard in finance literature, although
it is well known that the pioneering work of Bachelier ([2]) was formulated in the additive
form. In this paper we use additive model, because game-theoretic protocols are usually
formulated in an additive form and also because the limiting partial differential equation
is a more direct generalization of the heat equation.
A rigorous proof of our theorem is somewhat tedious and we first give some heuristic
arguments as to why (13) should hold. Later we give a more formal proof, by considering
an approximate superreplicating strategy as in Section 6.2 of [19].
For our argument it is more convenient to rescale the move space of Market in the
N -th game to
XN = { a
−
1√
N
, . . . ,
a−l√
N
,
a+1√
N
, . . . ,
a−m√
N
}. (16)
After this rescaling, the backward induction in (8) for the N -th game is written as
f¯N(s,N − n) = max
i,j
(
p−i;j f¯N (s+
a−i√
N
,N − n− 1) + p+j;if¯N(s+
a+j√
N
,N − n− 1)), (17)
where s = Sn and p
−
i;j, p
+
j;i are given by (6). The initial condition is given by f¯N(SN , 0) =
f(SN). Note that by backward induction (17) defines f¯N(s,N − n) for all s ∈ R, since f
is defined on the whole R1.
As in the proof of Proposition 2.4 f¯N(s,N − n) is a convex combination of values
f(s + SN−n). It should be noted that, unlike the case of convex f in Proposition 2.4,
the weights of the convex combination depend on s. However as seen from the proof of
Proposition 2.4, the weights are concentrated either on the two outermost values {a−l , a+m}
or on the two innermost values {a−1 , a+1 }, depending on the convexity of f¯N(s,N−n) in s.
Hence in each interval of convexity or concavity of f¯N(s,N − n), it is twice continuously
differentiable in s. In our numerical studies we found that if the payoff function f is
smooth and has only finite number of inflection points, then f¯N(s,N − n) as a function
of s has no more inflection points than f .
Write ν = N − n− 1. Then each term in the right-hand side of (17) is expanded as
p−i;j f¯N(s+
a−i√
N
, ν) + p+j;if¯N (s+
a+j√
N
, ν)
= p−i;j
(
f¯N(s, ν) +
a−i√
N
f¯ ′N(s, ν) +
(a−i )
2
2N
f¯ ′′N(s+ θi
a−i√
N
, ν)
)
+ p+j;i
(
f¯N (s, ν) +
a+j√
N
f¯ ′N (s, ν) +
(a+j )
2
2N
f¯ ′′N (s+ θj
a+j√
N
, ν)
)
= f¯N (s, ν) +
−a−i a+j
2N
f¯ ′′N(s, ν) +RN , (0 < θi, θj < 1),
10
where derivatives are with respect s and |NRN | = o(1) uniformly in s and ν. Then (17)
is written as
N(f¯N (s, ν + 1)− f¯N (s, ν)) = max
i,j
(−a−i a+j
1
2
f¯ ′′N(s, ν) +NRN ). (18)
If we ignore NRN = o(1), the right hand side is maximized by (i, j) = (l, m) or (i, j) =
(1, 1) depending on the sign of f¯ ′′N(s, ν).
Now by rescaling time axis define
φ¯N(s, t) = f¯N(s,Nt), s ∈ R, t ∈ [0, 1].
Then (18) is written as
φ¯N(s, t+∆t)− φ¯N(s, t)
∆t
= max
i,j
(−a−i a+j
1
2
φ¯′′N(s, t) +NRN ), ∆t = 1/N. (19)
This clearly corresponds to (13). However it seems difficult to let N → ∞ in (19) and
prove our theorem directly, although the finite difference approximation to HJB equations
in Chapter IX of [8] should hold in some form.
At this point we indicate how the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation (15) arises in the
multiplicative case. In the multiplicative multinomial model, xn is assumed to be of the
form xn − 1 ∈ XN , where XN is given in (16). Let Sn = x1 × · · · × xn. Then
Sn+1 = Sn × xn+1 = Sn + Sn × (xn+1 − 1).
The expansion of the right-hand side of (17) in the multiplicative model is
p−i;j f¯N(s+ s
a−i√
N
, ν) + p+j;if¯N (s+ s
a+j√
N
, ν) = f¯N (s, ν) +
−a−i a+j
2N
s2f¯ ′′N(s, ν) +RN . (20)
This corresponds to (15).
Instead of the above direct approach, knowing that (13) should hold, we can construct
an approximate superreplicating strategy of Investor and prove our theorem as in Section
6.2 of [19]. In the following proof, in order to show the inequality φ¯(0, 1) ≥ lim supN E¯(fN )
we adopt a suggestion by a referee.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By Theorem 4.6.9 of [15], the solution φ¯ to (13) has a continuous
first-order derivative in t and a continuous second-order derivative in s. See also Theorem
11 of [9] and [26]. Consider the following sequence
φ¯(0, 1), φ¯(S1,
N − 1
N
), . . . , φ¯(SN−1,
1
N
), φ¯(SN , 0),
where φ¯(SN , 0) = f(SN). Writing dSn = Sn+1−Sn = xn+1, Dn = 1−n/N , dDn = −1/N ,
we can expand the successive difference as
dφ¯(Sn, Dn) = φ¯(Sn+1, Dn+1)− φ¯(Sn, Dn)
=
∂
∂s
φ¯(Sn, Dn)dSn +
1
2
∂2
∂s2
φ¯(Sn, Dn)(dSn)
2 +
∂
∂t
φ¯(Sn, Dn)dDn +RN
=
∂
∂s
φ¯(Sn, Dn)dSn − 1
2N
(
σ˜2(Sn, Dn)−N(dSn)2) ∂
2
∂s2
φ¯(Sn, Dn) +RN , (21)
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where NRN = o(1) is uniformly in s and t. Consider a Markov superhedging strategy P
(cf. [9]) of Investor which choosesMn = (∂/∂s)φ¯(Sn, Dn). By adding (21) for n = 1, . . . , N
we have
f(SN)− φ¯(0, 1) = KPN −
1
2N
N∑
n=1
(
σ˜2(Sn, Dn)−N(dSn)2) ∂
2
∂s2
φ¯(Sn, Dn) + o(1). (22)
At this point we adopt a suggestion by a referee. From Proposition 2.1 and Remark
2.2 we know that the upper hedging price is computed as the expected value of f(SN)
under the extremal risk neutral measure, say p∗ = p∗N . Under any risk neutral measure,
KPn , n = 1, . . . , N , is a measure-theoretic martingale and its expected value is zero. Now
consider the expected value of
(
σ˜2(Sn, Dn)−N(dSn)2) ∂
2
∂s2
φ¯(Sn, Dn)
under p∗. We can evaluate the expected value, first by conditioning on x1, . . . , xn. By the
definition of σ˜2, under p∗ the conditional variance of
√
NdSn satisfies
E(N(dSn)
2 | x1, . . . , xn) ≤ σ˜2 if ∂
2
∂s2
φ¯(Sn, Dn) ≥ 0
E(N(dSn)
2 | x1, . . . , xn) ≥ σ˜2 otherwise.
Therefore taking the unconditional expected value of (22) under p∗ we have E¯(fN) −
φ¯(0, 1) ≤ 0 except for a term of order o(1). Hence lim supN E¯(fN) ≤ φ¯(0, 1).
Conversely, consider Market’s randomized moves chosen according to the extremal risk
neutral measure corresponding to E¯(fN), which is concentrated to two outermost values
{a−l , a+m} or two innermost values {a−1 , a+1 } at each node of the game tree, depending
on the sign of φ¯′′ (see Remark 2.2). Investor’s capital is a measure-theoretic martingale
under this risk neutral measure. Since the measure is supported on two points at each
node of the game tree, we can modify the standard argument for binomial models to show
that the expected value of the payoff f converges to φ¯(0, 1) under the measure. On the
other hand E¯(fN ) is the supremum over all possible moves of Market. Therefore we have
φ¯(0, 1) ≤ lim infN E¯(fN).
Remark 4.3. In the above proof we partly used measure theoretic arguments as suggested
by a referee. Although we can give a purely game theoretic proof in the line of Section 6.2
of [19], it is somewhat tedious. The difficulty lies in the fact that ∂
2
∂s2
φ¯(Sn, Dn) is path-
dependent. Note that by the game-theoretic law of large numbers ([19], [11]), Investor can
force that SN/
√
N converge to 0. This implies that for large N the empirical distribution
of Market’s moves is approximately a risk neutral measure and
∑N
n=1(dSn)
2 is the variance
of a risk neutral measure. However because each (dSn)
2 is multiplied by ∂
2
∂s2
φ¯(Sn, Dn), the
convergence SN/
√
N → 0 does not imply
lim inf
N
1
N
N∑
n=1
(
σ˜2(Sn, Dn)−N(dSn)2) ∂
2
∂s2
φ¯(Sn, Dn) ≥ 0.
12
Although the argument can be fixed by discretization of the values of ∂
2
∂s2
φ¯(Sn, Dn), we
omit the details.
Numerically (13) can be solved by the following backward induction: 1) discretization
of the interval [0, 1] and R, 2) approximation of the second derivative (∂2/∂s2)φ¯ by the
second order difference of three neighboring points. Actually this backward induction is
entirely similar to the exact backward induction in (8). When the discretization is not fine
enough, then the above numerical approximation corresponds to pruning of maximizations
discussed in Section 3. This suggests that a coarse discretization of the partial differential
equation yields an approximation which is less than the the true φ¯(s, 0).
5 Numerical examples
In this section we check results of this paper by numerical computation.
We first calculate the upper hedging price and the lower hedging price of Butterfly
spread option f(SN) = max(0, SN+0.5)−2max(0, SN−0.5)+max(0, SN−1.5) in Figure 1
under the trinomial model (a1 = −1/
√
N, a2 = 1/
√
N, a3 = 2/
√
N). Although Butterfly
spread does not satisfy the differentiability condition of Theorem 4.1, it can be arbitrarily
closely approximated by a payoff function satisfying the condition of Theorem 4.1. The
results are shown in Figure 2 in conjunction with the price under the binomial models.
From Figure 2, we see that the upper price and the lower price are different from the price
under the binomial models.
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
S
Y
Figure 1: Butterfly spread
We now add a new Market’s move a4 to the trinomial model and compare the former
trinomial model (a1 = −1, a2 = 1, a3 = 2) to this quadnomial model. We consider the
following three values of a4 as depicted in Figure 3.
1. a4 =
2.5√
N
(a1 < 0 < a2 < a3 < a4) “outside”.
2. a4 =
1.5√
N
(a1 < 0 < a2 < a4 < a3) “middle”.
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Figure 2: Comparison of binomial model and trinomial model
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Figure 3: Expansion trinomial model into quadnomial model
3. a4 =
0.5√
N
(a1 < 0 < a4 < a2 < a3) “inside”.
Figures 4, 5, 6 show the upper hedging prices of the butterfly spread for these quad-
nomial models compared to those of the trinomial model. In Figure 5 the upper hedging
prices under the quadnomial model equal those under the trinomial model with increasing
N , whereas in Figures 4, 6 the upper hedging prices under the quadnomial models differ
from those under the trinomial model.
Next we consider the payoff f = sin(10Sn), which has a lot of changes from convexity
to concavity, and similarly calculate the upper hedging prices. The results are shown in
Figures 7, 8, 9. Also in this case the upper hedging prices under the quadnomial model
equal those under the trinomial model with increasing N , provided that a4 = 1.5.
Next, we vary the values of a4 from 0 to 5 by 0.1. Figure 10 displays the plot of the
upper hedging prices of the butterfly spread for 1 ≤ N ≤ 50 and 0 ≤ a4 ≤ 5. From
Figure 10, we see that the upper hedging prices converge to an equal value in the interval
1 ≤ a4 ≤ 2.
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Figure 4: ( 2.5√
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Finally Figure 11 shows a numerical solution to the partial differential equation (13)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and −2 ≤ s ≤ 2 for the case of Butterfly spread f(s) = max(0, SN + 0.5)−
2max(0, SN − 0.5) + max(0, SN − 1.5). We compute an approximation of φ¯(s, t) by the
following difference scheme:
φ¯n+1i − φ¯ni
∆t
=
σ˜2
2
φ¯ni+1 − 2φ¯ni + φ¯ni−1
∆s2
,
{
σ˜2 = σ¯2, if φ¯ni+1 − 2φ¯ni + φ¯ni−1 ≥ 0,
σ˜2 = σ2, if φ¯ni+1 − 2φ¯ni + φ¯ni−1 < 0.
(23)
We rewrite (23) as
φ¯n+1i = φ¯
n
i +
σ˜2∆t
2∆s2
(φ¯ni+1 − 2φ¯ni + φ¯ni−1),
{
σ˜2 = σ¯2, if φ¯ni+1 − 2φ¯ni + φ¯ni−1 ≥ 0,
σ˜2 = σ2, if φ¯ni+1 − 2φ¯ni + φ¯ni−1 < 0.
(24)
We set σ2 = 1 and σ¯2 = 2 (13). For discretization we use ∆t = 1
300
and ∆s = 1
10
, which
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Figure 10: Comparison of trinomial model and quadnomial model for various a4
satisfies the stability condition (Section 8.4 of [29] or page 47 of [23])
∆t
(∆s)2
=
1
3
≤ 1
2
for discretization of the heat equation Since our partial differential equation (13) can be
understood as a piecewise heat equation, in our numerical experiments we found that ∆t
and ∆s satisfying the same stability condition works well. With ∆t = 1
300
and ∆s = 1
10
,
we obtain φ¯(0, 1) ≈ 0.3817 and φ(0, 1) ≈ 0.2060 using difference scheme (24). In Figure
12, we compute (14) for the lower prices by the similar difference method. Table 1 shows
the upper prices and the lower prices obtained in Figure 2. We find that these converge
to the values obtained by the difference method for the partial differential equations (13)
and (14).
Table 1: Upper prices and lower prices of trinomial model
N upper price lower prices
1 0.2500 0.0000
20 0.3824 0.1926
40 0.3790 0.1993
60 0.3820 0.2012
80 0.3799 0.2032
100 0.3807 0.2032
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Figure 11: Numerical solution of the PDE (13)
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Figure 12: Numerical solution of the PDE (14)
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we discussed various approximations and asymptotics of upper hedging
prices in multinomial models. In particular we showed that, as the number of rounds
goes to infinity, the upper hedging price of a European option converges to the solution
of an additive form of the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation. By numerical experiments
we checked that this convergence is fast and the asymptotic approximation is useful.
A multinomial model is the simplest example of incomplete market. A natural exten-
sion of a multinomial model is the bounded forecasting game ([19]), where Market’s move
is a bounded interval containing the origin. This problem was already considered in [17].
Most results of this paper can be extended to the bounded forecasting game.
Usually the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation is studied in the case of vector-valued
processes. Then the maximum variance and the minimum variance are no longer uniquely
determined and the maximization in each step of the game tree is more complicated.
Numerical studies of vector-valued cases are left to our future investigation.
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